We examine whether options granted to rank and file employees affect the performance of the firm by exploring the link between option portfolio implied incentives and firm operating performance. We employ an instrumental variables approach that combines information about the labor market characteristics in which firms compete with information on firm option programs from the IRRC to identify causal effects. Firms whose non-executive employee option portfolios have higher implied incentives exhibit higher subsequent operating performance. Consistent with economic theories, the incentive-performance effect is larger in smaller firms and in firms with higher growth opportunities. Additionally, the incentive-performance effect is concentrated solely in firms that grant options broadly to non-executive employees. Our results suggest that freeriding does not dominate incentives for options programs and are consistent with non-executive options inducing mutual monitoring among co-workers.
Introduction
Over the last two decades, the granting of company stock options to nonexecutive employees has become an important and increasingly common component of compensation policy 1 (Mehran and Tracy (2001) , Murphy (2003) ). While there is a vast academic literature addressing option compensation for executive employees, there have been comparatively few papers on the use of option grants as compensation for nonexecutive employees. Most existing work focuses on the rationales for use of these options in the workplace 2 . In this study, we address an open question in the literature:
whether stock options granted to rank and file employees affect the resulting performance of the firm.
Typically, accepted economic wisdom is that while options may be granted due to financial constraints or labor market considerations, they are unlikely to have an effect on performance beyond these channels. Most theoretical treatments of non-executive option programs argue that free-riding among employees will outweigh any incentive effects, as the option grants align the incentives of the worker with increasing the value of the whole firm rather than with individual performance (Core and Guay (2001) , Oyer (2004) , Oyer and Schaefer (2005a) ). When employees are compensated for joint performance improvements, they share the rewards from higher effort, resulting in dilution of worker incentives and mitigation of additional effort (Alchian and Demsetz (1972) ). Therefore, as non-executive options are granted across the firm, free-riding would be expected to preclude any performance effects. 3 An alternative literature, however, suggests that nonexecutive options may induce mutual monitoring among co-workers (Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) ). If employees jointly agree to exert high effort, and monitor their colleagues in order to enforce such collusion, the incentive for the individual worker to exert effort will increase. In this mutual monitoring scenario, while it is clear that hiring and retention, as well as firm financial constraints, may still motivate option grants, using 1 The National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO) estimates that as of the year 2005, 4000 U.S. companies had broad-based stock option plans, defined as plans that grant options to 50% or more of company employees. 2 Oyer and Schaefer (2005a) and Ittner, Lambert and Larcker (2003) , for example, argue that sorting and retention motives appear to be consistent with empirical data. Others, such as Core and Guay (2001) , argue that firms grant options due to cash and other financial constraints. 3 In fact, under conventional methods for measuring such programs, we document that non-executive options are granted quite broadly, with 44% of firms in our sample demonstrating broad-based programs.
equity based compensation may then have incentive effects, especially if such plans are broad-based.
Exploring the impact of options on firm performance empirically is nontrivial. To isolate the effect of non-executive stock options on firm performance, we must carefully control for the endogenous nature of the existence and scope of these plans. Our models employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach that centers on determinants of option grants and incentives that are unlikely to be related to our measures of operating performance.
Much of the prior empirical literature on non-executive employee stock options has employed measures of annual stock option grants to rank-and-file employees. We can more directly capture the incentives implied by a non-executive option plan by looking at the total sensitivity of the value of the firm's outstanding non-executive options to an increase in the underlying value of a firm's stock. One of the constraints in the prior literature in this area has been that ExecuComp, a typical source for options data, only allows the researcher to infer grants to non-executive employees, rather than the basic characteristics of the entire portfolio of outstanding options. Using new data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center's (IRRC) Dilution Database, we are able to observe the total options outstanding for a broad panel of firms. This allows us to look directly at the entire portfolio of outstanding rank-and-file employee options, and to obtain a measure of implied incentives, rather than relying on proxies for grants.
For our measure of implied rank-and-file incentives from outstanding options, we calculate the total sensitivity of the firm's non-executive options to an increase in the underlying value of a firm's stock, i.e. the cumulative delta of the firm's non-executive options. We examine the relationship between this incentive measure and subsequent firm operating performance, as measured by the firm's return on assets (ROA) and cash flow to assets (CFA). Controlling for the potential endogeneity of non-executive stock option incentives, we find that these incentives exert a positive effect on firm performance. This positive effect of the implied option incentives on subsequent firm performance suggests that free-riding stemming from an individual employee's inability to substantially affect firm value or profits on his own may not outweigh the incentive effect provided by stock options in this setting, and is consistent with mutual monitoring among co-workers overcoming the free-riding problem. 4 Next, we attempt to ascertain where the positive relationship between option incentives and firm performance is most effective. Free-riding is aggravated in large firms (Holmstrom (1982) ). In smaller firms, employees share the rewards for their efforts with fewer colleagues, thus reducing the free-riding problem. At the same time, mutual monitoring, which may counteract free-riding, is likely to be less effective in large firms, as employees in large groups may be less able to observe each other's efforts and less willing to incure the costs associated with monitoring and sanctioning their fellow workers (Heckathorn (1988) , Kandel and Lazear (1992) ). Thus, we expect any incentives from non-executive options to be most effective in smaller firms, and particularly so if free-riding is a dominant factor. When we segment our sample into smaller and larger firms, however, we find that the relation between incentives and performance is not confined to smaller firms, though the effect is larger for smaller firms than for larger ones.
Similarly, incentives from options should be most effective in firms where employee effort is more likely to have a significant effect on creating real value. In firms with higher growth opportunities, the impact of any one worker's effort is greater, and the rewards to be split with colleagues from obtaining a performance improvement are greater, thus strengthening the incentive to monitor and sanction colleagues. We segment our sample into firms with high and low growth opportunities per employee (Core and Guay (2001) ) and repeat our analysis. We find that non-executive option incentives exert a significant positive influence on performance in firms with higher growth opportunities, but not in firms with lower growth options.
The above findings suggest that mutual monitoring may outweigh free-riding.
The incentive for workers to exert effort should be higher when the joint performance goal on the basis of which they will be compensated is dependent on other workers who do receive similar incentive compensation. In many firms, options are granted broadly, to most, if not all employees (Oyer and Schaefer (2005) ). In other firms, option grants to 4 Labor market considerations might result in more sensitive pay for performance attracting higher quality workers. In this case, delta may not capture a pure incentive effect, but the results still represent a causal relation between delta and subsequent performance.
non-executive employees are targeted towards specific workers or groups of workers.
When options are targeted, rather than granted broadly, workers may be less likely to work hard, since the individual worker cannot expect to have a significant effect on the performance of the firm as a whole, and the worker is aware that other employees may not have similar incentives. Similarly, mutual monitoring is more likely to occur when workers know all have similar incentives, and therefore can jointly decide to maximize total gains by exerting effort and sanctioning those who deviate from the group agreement. Thus, mutual monitoring is more likely to obtain in firms where options are granted broadly. Taken together, we expect to see a stronger relationship between option incentives and performance in firms that broadly grant options. When we examine the relationship between operating performance and the existence of broad-based option grants in the cross-section of firms, we find that both a naïve OLS modeling of the relationship and the IV approach observe a positive relationship between broad option grants to non-executive employees and subsequent operating performance. We then interact option portfolio incentives with an indicator for broad-based grants to nonexecutive employees. We find that incentive effects are significantly and positively related to performance only for the group of firms with broad-based plans. We consider it unlikely that the existence of a broad-based program is merely a proxy for high incentives, for two reasons. First, having a broad-based program is determined by a firm's grants in a particular year, whereas the option portfolio incentives are calculated off the entire outstanding portfolio of non-executive options. Second, we observe no statistical difference between the incentives implied by the options outstanding for firms segmented by whether they have broad-based plan.
Our findings provide new insights into this expanding form of non-executive compensation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to document a causal relationship between non-executive option portfolio incentives and firm performance.
Furthermore, our findings suggest that free-riding is unlikely to be the dominant effect in this setting, and that option compensation can have a causal incentive effect on firm performance. While free-riding may mitigate the incentive effects of option compensation to some degree, an incentive effect remains, consistent with option compensation inducing mutual monitoring among co-workers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on non-executive stock options. In Section 3, we describe the data used in the study and present some descriptive statistics. In Section 4, we present our empirical analysis of the relationship between the implied incentives of non-executive stock option portfolios and firm performance. In Section 5, we more closely examine free-riding and mutual monitoring. In Section 6, we examine the incentive-performance relationship for targeted and broad-based option plans. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
While there is a vast academic literature addressing option compensation for executive employees (see Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) , Murphy (1999) for an overview), there have been comparatively few papers on the use of option grants as compensation for non-executive employees. Early literature on broad based equity compensation for non-executive workers examined stock price responses to the adoption of employee stock purchase programs, and found positive responses to such announcements (Bhagat, et al., 1985) . In these cases, however, it is difficult to separate any positive effects related to the adoption of the plan from potential signaling effects about future company performance. Kedia and Mozumdar (2002) examine the relationship between the total level of firm stock option grants and firm stock market performance using a sample of 200 large NASDAQ firms in 1999. However, in an efficient market, there is no particular reason to expect a positive relationship between option grants and abnormal returns if option granting behavior remains relatively constant over time. A more direct approach to studying whether non-executive option programs affect performance is to look directly at firm operating performance. By tying options measures to objective measures that are not influenced by future expectations, we can obtain a clearer portrait of the effect that non-executive option plans option programs have on the performance of firms and the economy.
Sesil, Kroumova, Blasi and Kruse (2002) study differences in financial outcomes for companies that do and do not grant stock options broadly. Ittner, Lambert and Larcker (2003) study the determinants of grants in a sample of companies that employ option plans and measure the success of these plans against the company's stated objectives.
Both these studies treat the existence of the stock option plan as given. In contrast, our work accounts for the endogenous nature of stock option plans. Oyer and Schaefer (2005a) consider three possible economic justifications for broad-based option programs.
They conclude that sorting and retention appear to be most consistent with empirical data. Core and Guay (2001) , argue that firms grant options due to cash and other financial constraints. Our approach takes advantage of the fact that grants may be related to sorting and retention needs or firm financial constraints, and looks at the residual effects of these options on firm performance.
Other papers on non-executive options plans include Oyer and Schaefer (2005b) , who compare observed stock option grant programs to hypothetical cash-only and restricted stock-based plans, and reject tax-based favorable accounting explanations for the granting of non-executive stock options. Oyer (2004) considers a model of broadbased stock option grants that can explain the use and recent rise of broad-based stock option plans even if these pay plans have no effect on employees' on-the-job behavior. Mehran and Tracy (2001) examine the effect of stock option exercises on employee compensation in the 1990's. Zhang (2002) investigates a market-valuation-based hypothesis for employee stock options, and Liang and Weisbenner (2001) examine the relationship between firm market valuation and option grants. Bergman and Jenter (2005) analyze the relationship between option grants to non-executive employees and employee optimism. Hand (2005) argues that compensating too few employees with options may more negatively affect performance than granting too deeply. Landsman, Lang and Yeh (2005) examine the determinants and consequences of the split of options between executive and non-executive employees. We obtain data on firm operating performance and other financial characteristics from Compustat. We use CRSP data to obtain risk-free rates. Data on industry level labor turnover is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and data on education levels by geographic region is obtained from the Census Bureau 2000 Census.
Description of Data

Dependent Variables
As a measure of incentives implied by a firm's portfolio of non-executive stock options, we compute the cumulative option delta, the change in employee wealth for a 1% change in stock price, for each firm, for the firm's non-executive option portfolio outstanding at the end of the year. We use the one-year estimation method for portfolio incentives outlined in Core and Guay (2002) . 6 We calculate the incentive measure for the total portfolio of options for all employees using the aggregate number of options 5 Because each year of data from IRRC contains two years of lagged data when available for variables of interest, we purchase each 3rd year of data beginning in 1997. As such, our sample approximates the S&P 1500. 6 Core and Guay (2002) Presumably, free-riding among employees will be less of a concern, and mutual monitoring more likely, in smaller firms, firms where growth are opportunities are larger, and where the growth of the firm is more likely to be affected by any individual worker.
We interact our measure of incentives with indicator variables based on above or below median measures of these characteristics. The number of employees is used to capture this aspect of firm size. We employ firm market-to-book ratio as a measure of overall growth opportunities. To proxy for the influence an individual worker may have, we calculate growth options per employee as in Core and Guay (2001) , defined as the market value of equity minus the book value of equity, divided by the number of employees.
To determine if a firm's non-executive stock option program is broad-based, i.e.
grants options to over 50% of employees, we follow the criterion described in Oyer and Schaefer (2005) . Because many firms have more than five very high ranking employees, which is the required threshold for detailed option compensation reporting, defining nonexecutive options as all options granted to employees other than the five most highly compensated executives tends to overstate the level of option grants and incentives for non-executive employees, particularly those in large firms. Oyer and Schaefer (2005) , calibrating from a data set where they can observe option program eligibility directly, assume that the top 10% of employees receive an option grant one-tenth as large as the grants received by the 2 nd through 5 th most highly paid employees in the firm. They classify a program as broad-based if the residual grants to employees after this 7 Our data source does not separate aggregate options information by exercisable and non-exercisable options. In essence, we assume all are exercisable at the average time to expiration. 8 We compute two such measures for portfolio incentives: one that is the cumulative incentives for all employees other than the top five executive officers, and one allowing an adjustment for other executives beyond the top five. The adjustment for high ranking employees follows the logic described in Oyer and Schaefer (2005) ; here, we assume the top 10% of employees hold a portfolio one tenth as large as the portfolios of the second through fifth most highly paid employees. For brevity, we report results using only the first measure, however we obtain similar results using the second measure as well. adjustment exceed 0.5% of the shares outstanding. We define our variable BroadPlan accordingly, and also interact it with our measure of portfolio incentives.
We examine two measures of operating performance. Our first measure of performance is operating return on assets before depreciation. Barber & Lyon (1996) argue that this measure is the preferred measure of operating performance because it is unaffected by leverage, extraordinary items, discretionary expenditures, or depreciation policy. Our second measure is cash flow deflated by assets. For each firm, we compute both industry-adjusted ROA (CFA), which is the difference between the firm's ROA (CFA) in a given year and the industry median (defined using the Fama-French 30 industry classification), and normalized industry-adjusted ROA (CFA), which is the percentage difference between the firm's ROA (CFA) in a given year and the industry median. A natural concern might be that these measures are mechanically higher for firms employing option compensation given the accounting treatment of such plans. We recalculate these measures subtracting out the Black-Scholes value of the option grants from the numerator and our results are robust to this alternative treatment.
Instruments
To draw causal inferences about the impact of non-executive options on firm performance, we must treat the incentives implied by the options as endogenous. The extent to which firms grant options to non-executive employees is affected by characteristics of the firm and the marketplace that may also affect operating performance. Failing to correct for this fact in our models could lead to inconsistent estimation and misleading inference. We therefore consider a number of instruments for the implied incentives of rank and file option plans. Our instruments are positively correlated with the extent of options grants to non-executive employees (and their implied incentives), but are unlikely to affect year over year industry-adjusted operating performance directly.
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One of the rationales offered for the granting of non-executive options is the retention of employees. Therefore, we employ a measure of annual average industry turnover by two-digit SIC code taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Job Openings 9 Ultimately, this is an empirical question, and our tests suggest the instruments are exogenous.
and Labor Turnover Survey. This aggregate measure can be taken as exogenous to the individual firm. Additionally, if options for non-executives are thought be a means for companies to attract and retain employees, especially in jobs where human capital is important, option plans may be correlated with education levels in the geographic region where the company competes for employees. As a measure of labor market competitiveness along this dimension, we compute using 2000 Census Data the natural log of the number of masters degrees held by the male population in the region of the company's headquarters location, defined by two-digit zip code. 10 Also, since the number of employees will likely increase the aggregate incentives offered (and, later, likely decrease the probability of a broad plan), we include the natural log of the number of employees as an instrument.
Note that our objective in this exercise is to identify exogenous instruments that are correlated with the incentives implied by the outstanding non-executive option portfolio. Our goal is not to identify (nor do we econometrically require) all factors that may influence broad granting of options or option portfolio incentives. Rather, we seek to build an instrumental variables model that will allow us to properly identify causal effects of broad-based plans or option incentives on performance.
Control Variables
To isolate the performance effects of non-executive stock options, we must first control for a variety of firm characteristics that may affect the operating performance of the firm, and in some cases, the granting of options as well. Larger firms and older firms may have different operating performance characteristics than smaller or younger firms.
We control for firm size using the natural log of market value of assets, defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of assets. We control for the age of a firm using the natural log of the number of years the firm has been publicly traded. Marginal corporate tax rates may also affect the tendency to grant options (Yermack (1995), Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1996) , Hall and Liebman (2000) ) and likely affect our aftertax measure of performance. Option compensation should be more costly for firms with high marginal tax rates. Firms receive an immediate tax deduction for cash compensation, as opposed to the future tax deduction from deferred compensation instruments such as options. We define indicator variables for firms facing high (HMT) or low (LMT)
marginal tax rates as in Core and Guay (2001) . HMT takes the value of one if the firm has positive income and no net operating loss carryforwards in any of the previous three years, and zero otherwise; LMT takes the value of one if the firm has negative taxable income and net operating loss carryforwards in each of the previous three years, and zero otherwise. To capture the effects of the tax shields provided by debt, we include an indicator variable for the existence of long-term debt. Further, option grants and performance are both influenced by a company's research intensity. We therefore include the three-year average of R&D expenditures as a control variable. Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) suggest that interdependencies among operating units, and therefore aggregate performance measures, increase with firm inter-segment sales, and decrease with greater product market and geographic diversification. We control for the ratio of inter-segment sales to total net sales for the firm. Using data from the Compustat segments file, we define product diversification as ∑ i P i *ln(1/P i ), where P i is the dollar sales of product i divided by total firm sales. Geographic diversification is similarly
where G i is the dollar value of sales for geographic region i divided by total firm sales.
While it is unlikely that non-executive employees can effectively shift the risk profile of the firm, recent studies suggest that executive incentive contracts may have such an effect in addition to providing incentives (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2007) ). We therefore include a measure for the portfolio delta for the top five executives (the sensitivity of executive wealth to changes in stock price) and vega (the sensitivity of executive wealth to changes in stock price volatility). Finally, we include year fixed
effects.
An important aspect of our research design is that we do not ask whether broadbased plans or non-executive option portfolio incentives are priced. Instead, we focus on the question of how these option plan characteristics affect the operating performance of the firm. Accordingly, we do not include stock performance related variables in our analysis. If we were to include such variables, which may already incorporate market pricing of these instruments, we may not discern a performance effect simply because it is already priced into market-related controls. 
Non-Executive Option Incentives and Firm Performance
We begin by examining the effect of the incentives implied by the total outstanding non-executive employee option portfolio on realized firm operating performance. To draw causal inferences, we address the fact that non-executive option grants are endogenously determined by other factors that may be related to firm performance.
To provide a benchmark, we first estimate a naïve OLS model of the relationship between firm performance and the implied incentives of the outstanding option portfolio.
The dependent variable is one of four measures of firm operating performance: industryadjusted ROA, normalized industry-adjusted ROA, industry-adjusted CFA, and normalized industry-adjusted CFA. The main explanatory variable of interest is the existence of a broad-based stock option plan. Our dataset is an unbalanced panel.
Standard errors are White (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent, clustered at the firm level.
As controls, we include firm operating performance in year t-1, prior 3 year average R&D expenditures, firm long term debt in year t-1, firm size, firm product diversification, firm geographic diversification, firm inter-segment relatedness, the indicator for low marginal tax rate, the indicator for high marginal tax rate, portfolio delta of the option portfolio of the top five executives in the firm, and portfolio vega of the option portfolio of the top five executives in the firm
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. We also include year fixed effects. In all four models, we observe a non-negative relationship between option incentives and firm performance, though pnly the CFA specifications produce a 11 We note that the coefficients on the last 2 variables should be regarded as correlations throughout the analysis. statistically significant coefficient. As they can not be interpreted in a causal fashion, for the sake of brevity, we do not report these estimates in table form.
While our benchmark estimates in the naïve OLS model suggest a possible positive relationship between the existence of a broad-based non-executive stock option plan and subsequent firm operating performance, before drawing causal inferences, we must address the concern that option grants are endogenous. To do this, we employ an IV approach, where the first stage model predicts the implied option incentive measure using the exogenous instruments described in Section 3.3 and all explanatory variables from the performance equation, and the second stage model predicts firm performance. Table 2 presents the estimates from our IV models for operating performance. In
Panel A, we present OLS regressions of our incentives measure on our three proposed instruments one at a time and all together. Our instruments appear to be well-correlated with our endogenous variable. Our proposed instruments have differential power for predicting the implied incentives of the option portfolio. Both the natural logarithm of the number of employees in the firm and the geographic education level are significantly and positively related to our incentives measure, both when used as the sole dependent variable and when used in concert with our other instruments and industry controls. In contrast, industry turnover does not appear to be significantly related to implied nonexecutive option plan incentives.
12 Staiger and Stock (1997) note that having valid instruments that meet the exclusion restriction is not sufficient to ensure consistent two-stage estimators in finite samples. The instruments also have to be 'strong' in the sense that they correlate 'strongly' with the endogenous first-stage variable. Staiger and Stock recommend a critical value of 10 in an F-test for the joint significance of the instruments in the first
stage. An F statistic for the joint significance of all instruments exceeds the Staiger and Stock (1997) critical value, suggesting our instruments are collectively strong.
We can now examine the determinants of firm operating performance. The dependent variables are our four measures of operating performance used in the naïve OLS models above, namely industry-adjusted ROA, normalized industry-adjusted ROA, industry-adjusted CFA and normalized industry-adjusted CFA. (We will refer to these variables as normalized and non-normalized ROA and CFA for the remainder of the paper.)
Panel B of Table 2 presents the results of our full two-equation IV model estimations. The dependent variables are our four measures of operating performance, described in Section 2.2. The main explanatory variable of interest is NON-EXECUTIVE DELTA, the delta of the firm's non-executive option portfolio. The control variables are as outlined for the benchmark OLS above. 13 We estimate the four IV models using GMM. Standard errors are White (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent, clustered by firm.
All four models appear to be well-specified. The uncentered R-squared ranges from 31.84% for the model for normalized CFA, to 62.45% for the model for ROA.
Hansen J test statistics for over-identification of all instruments fail to reject the null of valid instruments across all four models. Anderson canonical correlations likelihood ratio tests for under-identification, which test that the instruments are relevant, reject the null of irrelevance at the 1% level. The Shea partial R-square test (unreported) indicates the excluded instruments increase explanatory power at over 99% confidence.
The estimates from the models support the hypothesis that the implied incentives of the option portfolio affect firm operating performance. The coefficient on nonexecutive option portfolio delta is positive and statistically significant. The economic effect is non-negligible: a one-standard deviation change in our incentives measure implies an increase of 12.34% in normalized ROA, and an increase of 1.48% in nonnormalized ROA. The magnitudes of the effects on CFA are larger: 26.11% increase in normalized CFA and 1.98% increase in non-normalized CFA for a one standard deviation increase in the incentives measure. The coefficients on the control variables are primarily as expected. Average R&D expenditure is significantly and negatively related to firm operating performance, while the existence of long term debt is significantly and positively associated with performance. Larger firms have lower performance, as do firms with greater geographic diversification. The delta of the top five executives option portfolio is significantly and positively related to performance, while the vega of said portfolio is significantly and negatively related to performance. Other controls, such as product market diversification, intersegment relationships, marginal tax rates and the age of the firm, observe no significant relationship to performance in the models.
The estimates from the four models are consistent with a positive, causal effect of option portfolio incentives on firm operating performance, suggesting that free-riding may not be the dominant force in determining the effect of non-executive stock options.
To further explore this finding, we now turn to a closer examination of the free-riding and mutual monitoring hypotheses.
Free-Riding and Mutual Monitoring
The fact that the implied incentives of the non-executive option portfolio positively affects firm operating performance could be considered surprising. Nonexecutive stock options may be granted to hundreds or thousands of employees, each of whom individually is likely to have a negligible impact on overall firm performance. In accepted economic wisdom, such conditions are generally expected to favor free-riding, and to limit mutual monitoring. To further explore this issue, we segment our sample on measures that are likely to be related to the incentives to free-ride or to encourage mutual monitoring: the size of the firm, the growth opportunities of the firm, and the growth options per employee at the firm.
In general, the incremental likelihood that an individual worker's wealth will increase through his option compensation if the worker exerts effort is expected to be a decreasing function of firm size, as overall performance is less sensitive to the actions of individual workers in larger firms. The larger is the firm, the greater the free-rider problem. Furthermore, compensation based on firm-wide performance introduces externalities between the efforts of individual workers and the welfare of their colleagues.
If a worker exerts low effort, he not only reduces the likelihood that he will receive an increase in his wealth from his options, but also the likelihood that other employees will receive a wealth increase. This creates incentives for employees to monitor their colleagues and encourage them to exert more effort. However, as noted by Knez and
Simester (2001), mutual monitoring induces a second order free-riding problem (wherein workers free-ride on their colleagues monitoring efforts), and the larger the firm, the greater this second-order free-riding problem. Hence, mutual monitoring may be less effective in larger firms.
As the free-rider problem is greater in larger organizations, and mutual monitoring may be less effective in large firms, we may expect the incentiveperformance effect documented in the previous section to be confined to smaller firms.
To test this hypothesis, we segment our sample at the median number of employees, and re-estimate our models, allowing the coefficient on our measure of non-executive delta to differ for firms with above-and below-median labor force size.
The results of our estimation are presented in the first two columns of Table 3 . In
Panel A the dependent variables are ROA and normalized ROA, and in Panel B the dependent variables are CFA and normalized CFA. All estimates are taken from IV models, with the first stage model for incentives as described in Section 4. Once again, the models appear to be well-specified. Uncentered R-squared is higher in the ROA models than in the CFA models, ranging from 11.77% for non-normalized CFA to 57.58% for ROA. Similarly, IV diagnostics support our choice of instrumental variables.
Hansen J test statistics for over-identification of all instruments fail to reject the null of valid instruments in both sets of models. Anderson canonical correlations likelihood ratio tests for under-identification reject the null at the 1% level in both models, and the partial R-square test for lack of explanatory power rejects at the 5% level.
The results in both sets of models are similar: while our incentive measure has a positive, statistically significant effect in both smaller and larger firms, this effect is much greater in smaller firms. A one standard deviation change in implied incentives for small firms produces a 2.38% increase in industry-adjusted ROA and a 21.02% increase in normalized ROA. In contrast, a similar change in the incentives measure for larger firms produces only a 1.45% increase in ROA and an 11.69% increase in normalized ROA.
Economic significance of similar magnitudes is observed for the CFA models. Tests of differences in the coefficients show the coefficient on incentives for smaller firms to be statistically significantly different than for larger firms at the 5% and 1% levels respectively for ROA and CFA, and at the 10% and 1% levels respectively for normalized ROA and CFA.
In similar fashion, one might expect that free-riding would be weaker, and coworker monitoring more likely, in firms where the ability of any individual worker to influence the overall success of the firm is higher. The idea is that individual effort may have a more significant effect on creating real value. To explore this hypothesis, we segment our sample based on high and low growth opportunities, as well as high and low growth options per employee. We proxy for growth opportunities using the firm's market-to-book ratio. Growth options per employee are calculated as in Core and Guay (2001) . We allow the coefficient on our measure of implied incentives to differ for firms with above-and below-median growth options, or growth options per employee, and reestimate our models.
The results are presented in the final four columns of Panels A and B of Table 5 .
All estimates are taken from IV models, with the first stage model for incentives as described in Section 4. As in our previous estimations, the models appear to be wellspecified. Uncentered R-squared ranges from 28.57% for normalized CFA to 61.53% for ROA. IV diagnostics again support our choice of instrumental variables. Hansen J test statistics for over-identification of all instruments fail to reject the null of valid instruments in both sets of models. Anderson canonical correlations likelihood ratio tests for under-identification reject the null at the 1% level in both models, as does the partial R-square test for lack of explanatory power.
The results from the estimations are consistent with the notion that free-riding may be weaker and co-worker monitoring may be more likely in firms with higher growth opportunities and with higher growth options per employee. Columns three and four of Panels A and B show that the performance effect of option incentives is concentrated in firms with high growth opportunities. For firms with above-median market-to-book ratios, a one-standard deviation change in incentives implies a 15.58% increase in normalized ROA and a 1.87% increase in ROA, both statistically significant at the 5% level. The marginal effects for high growth firm option incentives are slightly higher in the CFA models, with a one-standard deviation change in incentives implying an 27.4% increase in normalized CFA and a 2.37% increase in CFA for high growth firms. In contrast, the coefficients on incentives for low growth firms are in fact slightly negative in both the ROA and CFA models, and are not statistically significant. A test for differences in coefficients finds the coefficients on the incentives measure for high growth firms to be statistically significantly larger than for low growth firms at the 10% level for both ROA models and the non-normalized CFA model.
A similar picture is seen in columns five and six, where the sample is segmented based on growth options per employee. Here, a one-standard deviation change in incentives for firms with high growth options per employee implies an 1.75% increase in normalized ROA and a 1.97% increase in ROA, both significant at the 5% level. The corresponding marginal effects for the CFA models are 32.81% and 2.86%, both significant at the 1% level. Once again, the coefficients on incentives for low growth options per employee firms are slightly negative and not statistically significant. A test for differences in coefficients finds the coefficients on the incentives measure for high growth firms to be statistically significantly larger than for low growth firms at the 5% level for both ROA models and at the 1% level for both the CFA models. The partial Rsquare test for lack of explanatory power rejects at the 1% level for all of the models.
Targeted and Broad-Based Option Plans
In many firms, options are granted broadly, to most, if not all employees (Oyer and Schaefer (2005) ). In other firms, option grants to non-executive employees are targeted towards specific workers or groups of workers. Mutual monitoring is more likely to occur when workers know all have similar incentives, and therefore can jointly decide to maximize total gains by exerting effort and sanctioning those who deviate from the group agreement. Thus, mutual monitoring is more likely to obtain in firms where options are granted broadly. Taken together, we expect that any relationship between non-executive options and subsequent firm performance may be concentrated in firms that broadly grant options, and we expect to see a stronger relationship between the incentives implied by these options and performance in firms with broad-based option plans. Table 4 presents the mean and standard deviation of each of the dependent, independent and control variables for firm-years with and without BroadPlans, as well as the p-value from a difference of means test across the two sub-samples. In the univariate, industry-adjusted performance measures (ROA and CFA) are higher for firms with broad-based option plans. As one might expect, these firms are generally smaller, as measured by both assets and number of employees, are younger, have higher R&D expenditures, and lower incidences of long-term debt. There is no difference in incidences of high or low marginal tax rates. Also, these firms have lower measures of product diversification, higher measures of inter-segment relatedness, but no difference in geographic diversification.
Further, the BroadPlan sub-sample is characterized by lower average industry turnover and the firms are located in regions with slightly higher levels of education as measured by the population with masters degrees. There is no difference in implied incentives for the top-five executive as measured by option delta, but option vega is higher for firms with broad-based plans. Interestingly, the total incentives implied by non-executive options outstanding are not statistically different across the two subsamples.
We then turn to examining the effect of the existence of a broad-based stock option program for non-executive employees on realized firm operating performance. To draw causal inferences, we again address the fact that the extent of option programs (in addition to the incentives implied by the outstanding portfolio) are endogenously determined by other factors that may be related to firm performance.
To provide a benchmark, we first estimate a naïve OLS model of the relationship between firm performance and the existence of a broad-based option program. The dependent variable is one of four measures of firm operating performance. The main explanatory variable of interest is the existence of a broad-based stock option plan. Once again, our dataset is an unbalanced panel. Standard errors are White (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent, clustered at the firm level. As controls, we include firm operating performance in year t-1, prior 3 year average R&D expenditures, firm long term debt in year t-1, firm size, firm product diversification, firm geographic diversification, firm inter-segment relatedness, the indicator for low marginal tax rate, the indicator for high marginal tax rate, portfolio delta of the option portfolio of the top five executives in the firm, and portfolio vega of the option portfolio of the top five executives in the firm. We also include year fixed effects. We estimate models for our four measures of operating performance. Overall, the models appear to be well-specified; the R 2 range from 39.7% for normalized CFA to 63.8% for ROA.
For brevity, we do not report the results in table format. In all four models, we observe a statistically and economically significant and positive relationship between the existence of a broad-based option program and firm operating performance. All else equal, having a broad-based plan increases firm industry-adjusted ROA by 0.25 percentage points (versus an unconditional mean of 0.42%), and increases firm normalized industry-adjusted ROA by 3.39% (versus an unconditional mean of 2.5%).
The relationship between performance and the control variables is primarily as expected.
Lagged performance enters positively, with firms with higher performance in year t-1 observing higher performance in year t. R&D expenditures are negatively related to performance. Larger firms observe higher performance after controlling for other factors.
Geographic diversification is statistically negatively related to performance in three out of the four models, but with little economic significance. Intersegment relatedness is negatively related to performance, but is statistically significant only in the ROA specifications. The delta of the top five executives' option portfolio is positively related to performance, while the vega of the portfolio observes a negative relationship to performance. More mature firms observe lower performance. The indicator variable for low marginal tax rate is negative and significant in the CFA models specification, but insignificant in the ROA specifications. Similarly, the indicator variable for high marginal tax rate is positive and significant in the CFA specification, but insignificant in the ROA specifications. Other control variables such as long term debt and product diversification observe no significant relationship to operating performance.
While our results in the naïve OLS model suggest a positive relationship between the existence of a broad-based non-executive stock option plan and subsequent firm operating performance, as in our previous analyses, we must address the concern that option grants are endogenous. To do this, we once again employ an IV approach, where the first stage model is a probit predicting the binary variable for broad-based option plans using the same set of exogenous instruments used to predict option incentives, and the second stage model predicts performance using a fitted value from the first stage.
14 The first stage probit in our IV approach predicts the existence of a broad-based non-executive option plan as a function of the instruments presented in Section 3.3 and all explanatory variables from the performance equation. Panel A of Table 5 presents the estimates for each of our proposed instruments separately and together. Once again, our instruments appear to be well-correlated with our endogenous variable, however, the instruments with the greatest predictive power differ somewhat from the specification for predicting option incentives. Both industry turnover and the natural logarithm of the number of employees in the firm are negatively and significantly related to the existence of a broad-based plan, both when inserted alone or in concert with the other instruments.
In contrast, our third proposed instrument, which measures the education levels in the firm's geographical area, appears to be unrelated to the existence of a broad-based plan, regardless of specification.
As our first stage in nonlinear, the joint test of significance for the instruments in the first stage proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997) is distributed Chi-square. Our Chisquare measure for the specification with the three instruments is 165, implying p-values analogously small to pass the critical value threshold for the F-test and suggesting our instruments are collectively strong. Further, Bound et al. (1995) argue that high partial Rsquare, defined as the difference in R-square between the first stage regression with and without the excluded instruments, ensures instruments are sufficiently strong. We find that the inclusion of the instruments in a first stage Probit with all exogenous variables increases the pseudo R-square from 0.067 to 0.107, approximately 60%.
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In each of the four naïve OLS models, we observed a positive and statistically significant relationship between the existence of a broad-based option program and our measures of firm operating performance, consistent with the existence of a positive performance effect for broad-based non-executive option plans. What happens to this positive relation once we account for the endogeneity of the presence of a broad-based plan? Panel B of Table 5 presents the results of our IV models, instrumenting our broadbased plan indicator variable as described above. The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the control variables remain similar to those observed in the naïve OLS model estimation. For all four measures of operating performance, we continue to find a strong, positive and statistically significant relationship between the presence of a broadbased stock option plan for rank and file employees and subsequent firm operating performance. Having a broad-based plan is associated with a subsequent 1.33 percentage point increase in non-normalized ROA (versus an unconditional mean of .42%), and an increase of 9.99% in normalized ROA (versus an unconditional mean of 2.5%). The existence of a broad-based plan has a similar effect on subsequent firm CFA, resulting in a 1.1 percentage point increase in non-normalized CFA (versus an unconditional mean of .33%) and an 11.67% increase in normalized CFA (versus an unconditional mean of 3.4%). Collectively, the results from the four models suggest that even after accounting for the endogenous nature of broad-based stock option plans, granting options broadly to rank and file employees has a positive effect on firm performance.
We now turn to the interaction of option portfolio incentives and broad-based grants. Mutual monitoring effects and incentive effects in general should be stronger in firms where options are granted broadly, to most employees; hence, we would expect to see a stronger relationship between option incentives and performance in firms where options are granted more broadly.
To explore this hypothesis, we allow the coefficient on our measure of option portfolio incentives to differ for firms with and without broad-based option plans, and reestimate our models. The estimates for our models are presented in Table 6 . All models are estimated instrumenting for option incentives as described in Section 3. Uncentered R-squared ranges from 20.95% for normalized CFA to 59.40% for ROA. Once again, Hansen J test statistics for over-identification of all instruments fail to reject the null of valid instruments in all four of models. Both the partial R-square test for lack of explanatory power and the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood ratio tests for under-identification reject the null at the 1% level in all four models.
The results in Table 6 are striking. In all four models, the coefficient on option incentives for firms with broad-based option plans roughly doubles relative to the estimate in the full sample. In three of the models, the coefficient is significant at the 1% level; in the fourth model, it is significant at the 5% level. In contrast, the coefficient on incentives for firm without broad-based plans is slightly negative, and is not statistically significant in any of the four models. A test for differences in coefficients finds the coefficients on the incentives measure for high growth firms to be statistically significantly larger than for low growth firms at the 10% level for the ROA and CFA models, and at 5% for the normalized CFA specification.
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The models in Table 6 suggest that incentive effects are significantly and positively related to performance only for the group of firms with broad-based plans. We consider it unlikely that the existence of a broad-based program is merely a proxy for high incentives, for two reasons. First, having a broad-based program is determined by a firm's grants in a particular year, whereas the option portfolio incentives are calculated off the entire outstanding portfolio of non-executive options. Second, in examining the summary statistics presented in Table 4 for firms with and without broad plans, we observe no empirical relationship between having a broad-based plan for rank and file employees and the incentives implied by the options outstanding in that plan. Thus, our results appear to be consistent with the notion that broad-based plans are more likely to induce monitoring among co-workers.
Conclusion
Whether options granted to rank and file employees have causal effects on the performance of the firm is an open question in the existing economic literature. This paper examines this relationship by exploring the link between option portfolio implied incentives and firm operating performance. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to address in depth the question of these programs' effects on objective measures of firm performance while carefully accounting for the endogenous nature of these option plans.
Common economic wisdom holds that non-executive stock options are unlikely to affect the performance of the firm due to free-riding. Competing theories argue that mutual monitoring among employees may overcome the free-riding problem. A new, 16 The estimates for normalized ROA are noisier, with significant differences only at 82% confidance.
previously unemployed dataset allows us to obtain a measure of option portfolio incentives which is unobtainable from previous datasets such as Execucomp. We examine the total sensitivity of the firm's non-executive options to an increase in the underlying value of a firm's stock. Controlling for other likely determinants of firm operating performance, as well as the endogenous nature of option programs for nonexecutive employees, we find a positive, causal relationship between the implied incentives of the portfolio of outstanding non-executive options and subsequent firm operating performance. The magnitude of the incentive effect is economically large, and suggests that free-riding is not the dominant effect for these programs.
Consistent with economic theory, we find that the incentive-performance effect is larger in smaller firms, and in firms with higher growth opportunities and higher growth options per employee. Finally, we find that firms that broadly grant options to nonexecutive employees exhibit higher operating performance than firms that do not grant options broadly. Our models suggest that this performance effect is concentrated solely in firms that grant options broadly to non-executive employees, supporting the argument that options may induce monitoring among co-workers.
Our findings contribute to the emerging literature on the use of employee stock options as effective compensation tools. Our approach employs a wide cross-section of firms, and attempts to carefully account for the endogeneity of option granting behavior so as to be able to draw conclusions about causation rather than correlations alone. In addition, our results provide insight as to when the granting of such options is likely to have the strongest incentive effects, and find evidence suggesting that targeted incentives may be less effective in providing incentives than the use of broad-based plans. Our findings suggest that while free-riding may be present to some extent, mutual monitoring by co-workers may be the stronger force.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
The unit of analysis is a firm-year. BROADPLAN is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the company had a broad-based employee option plan, 0 otherwise; ADJUSTED ROA is industry-adjusted return on assets before depreciation; ADJUSTED CFA is industry-adjusted cash flow deflated by assets; NONEXEC DELTA is the estimated wealth increase for the employees other than the top 5 executives from a 1% change in stock price; R&D is the three-year average for R&D expenses; LONG TERM DEBT is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company had long-term debt, 0 otherwise; MARKET VALUE ASSETS is the market capitalization of the firm's equity plus the book value of debt; PRODUCT DIV measures product diversification using the number of firm segments; GEOGRAPHIC DIV measures geographic diversification using the number of geographic segments; INTERSEGMENT REL measures the relatedness of the firm's segments; LMT is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the company had a low marginal tax rate, 0 otherwise; HMT is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the company had a high marginal tax rate, 0 otherwise; TOP5 DELTA is the estimated wealth increase for the top 5 executives from a 1% change in stock price; TOP5 VEGA measures the convexity of compensation of the top 5 executives; AGE is the number of years the firm has been public; EMPLOYEES is the number of employees; INDUSTRY TURNOVER is average employee turnover for the company's 4-digit SIC code; MASTERS DEG is the number of masters degrees for the male population in the company's 2-digit zip code. This table presents the results of GMM estimation of IV regressions of industry-adjusted performance (ROA, ROS) on the delta of the outstanding nonexecutive option portfolio. The unit of analysis is a firm-year. Panel A present the results of OLS models where the dependent variable is the delta of the non-executive option portfolio, and the dependent variables are instruments. Panel B presents the estimates of the main model, instrumenting for option portfolio delta using the instruments from Panel A. NONEXEC DELTA is the estimated wealth increase for the employees other than the top 5 executives from a 1% change in stock price; EMPLOYEES is the number of employees; INDUSTRY TURNOVER is average employee turnover for the company's 4-digit SIC code; MASTERS DEG is the number of masters degrees for the male population in the company's 2-digit zip code. ROA is industry-adjusted return on assets before depreciation; CFA is industry-adjusted cash flow deflated by assets; R&D is the three-year average for R&D expenses; LONG TERM DEBT is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company had long-term debt, 0 otherwise; MARKET VALUE ASSETS is the market capitalization of the firm's equity plus the book value of debt; PRODUCT DIV measures product diversification using the number of firm segments; GEOGRAPHIC DIV measures geographic diversification using the number of geographic segments; INTERSEGMENT REL measures the relatedness of the firm's segments; LMT is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the company had a low marginal tax rate, 0 otherwise; HMT is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the company had a high marginal tax rate, 0 otherwise; TOP5 DELTA is the estimated wealth increase for the top 5 executives from a 1% change in stock price; TOP5 VEGA measures the convexity of compensation of the top 5 executives; AGE is the number of years the firm has been public; Standard errors are White heteroskedasticity-adjusted and are clustered for the same company (Rogers, 1993) . In parenthesis we report z-scores. Prob > F = 0.00 UC R-squared = .3558 *, ** or *** mean the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively This table presents the results of GMM estimation of IV regressions of industry-adjusted performance (ROA, ROS) on the delta of the outstanding nonexecutive option portfolio, split at the median value for a variety of measures. The unit of analysis is a firm-year. NONEXEC DELTA is the estimated wealth increase for the employees other than the top 5 executives from a 1% change in stock price; EMPLOYEES is the number of employees; INDUSTRY TURNOVER is average employee turnover for the company's 4-digit SIC code; MASTERS DEG is the number of masters degrees for the male population in the company's 2-digit zip code. ROA is industry-adjusted return on assets before depreciation; CFA is industry-adjusted cash flow deflated by assets; R&D is the three-year average for R&D expenses; LONG TERM DEBT is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company had longterm debt, 0 otherwise; MARKET VALUE ASSETS is the market capitalization of the firm's equity plus the book value of debt; PRODUCT DIV measures product diversification using the number of firm segments; GEOGRAPHIC DIV measures geographic diversification using the number of geographic segments; INTERSEGMENT REL measures the relatedness of the firm's segments; LMT is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the company had a low marginal tax rate, 0 otherwise; HMT is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the company had a high marginal tax rate, 0 otherwise; TOP5 DELTA is the estimated wealth increase for the top 5 executives from a 1% change in stock price; TOP5 VEGA measures the convexity of compensation of the top 5 executives; AGE is the number of years the firm has been public; Market to book is calculated as market value of assets over book value of assets. Growth options per employee is calculated as in Core and Guay (2001) as the difference between market value of assets and book value of assets divided by the number of employees. Standard errors are White heteroskedasticity-adjusted and are clustered for the same company (Rogers, 1993) . In parenthesis we report z-scores. The unit of analysis is a firm-year. BROADPLAN is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the company had a broad-based employee option plan, 0 otherwise; ADJUSTED ROA is industry-adjusted return on assets before depreciation; ADJUSTED CFA is industry-adjusted cash flow deflated by assets; NONEXEC DELTA is the estimated wealth increase for the employees other than the top 5 executives from a 1% change in stock price; R&D is the three-year average for R&D expenses; LONG TERM DEBT is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company had long-term debt, 0 otherwise; MARKET VALUE ASSETS is the market capitalization of the firm's equity plus the book value of debt; PRODUCT DIV measures product diversification using the number of firm segments; GEOGRAPHIC DIV measures geographic diversification using the number of geographic segments; INTERSEGMENT REL measures the relatedness of the firm's segments; LMT is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the company had a low marginal tax rate, 0 otherwise; HMT is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the company had a high marginal tax rate, 0 otherwise; TOP5 DELTA is the estimated wealth increase for the top 5 executives from a 1% change in stock price; TOP5 VEGA measures the convexity of compensation of the top 5 executives; AGE is the number of years the firm has been public; EMPLOYEES is the number of employees; INDUSTRY TURNOVER is average employee turnover for the company's 4-digit SIC code; MASTERS DEG is the number of masters degrees for the male population in the company's 2-digit zip code. This table presents the results of fitted value instrumental variables regressions of industry-adjusted Performance (ROA, ROS) on an indicator variable for a broad-based option plan. The unit of analysis is a firm-year. Panel A present the results of probit models where the dependent variable is an indicator for having a broad-based plan, and the dependent variables are instruments. Panel B presents the estimate of the second stage regression, instrumenting from the existence of a broad-based plan using the instruments from Panel A. BROADPLAN is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the company had a broad-based employee option plan, 0 otherwise; EMPLOYEES is the number of employees; INDUSTRY TURNOVER is average employee turnover for the company's 4-digit SIC code; MASTERS DEG is the number of masters degrees for the male population in the company's 2-digit zip code. ROA is industry-adjusted return on assets before depreciation; CFA is industry-adjusted cash flow deflated by assets; R&D is the three-year average for R&D expenses; LONG TERM DEBT is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company had long-term debt, 0 otherwise; MARKET VALUE ASSETS is the market capitalization of the firm's equity plus the book value of debt; PRODUCT DIV measures product diversification using the number of firm segments; GEOGRAPHIC DIV measures geographic diversification using the number of geographic segments; INTERSEGMENT REL measures the relatedness of the firm's segments; LMT is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the company had a low marginal tax rate, 0 otherwise; HMT is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the company had a high marginal tax rate, 0 otherwise; TOP5 DELTA is the estimated wealth increase for the top 5 executives from a 1% change in stock price; TOP5 VEGA measures the convexity of compensation of the top 5 executives; AGE is the number of years the firm has been public; Standard errors are White heteroskedasticity-adjusted and are clustered for the same company (Rogers, 1993) . In parenthesis we report z-scores. Table 6 Targeted versus Broad Incentives
This table presents the results of GMM estimation of IV regressions of industry-adjusted performance (ROA, ROS) on the delta of the outstanding non-executive option portfolio for firms with and without broad-based option plans. The unit of analysis is a firm-year. BROADPLAN is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the company had a broad-based employee option plan, 0 otherwise; NONEXEC DELTA is the estimated wealth increase for the employees other than the top 5 executives from a 1% change in stock price; ROA is industry-adjusted return on assets before depreciation; CFA is industry-adjusted cash flow deflated by assets; R&D is the three-year average for R&D expenses; LONG TERM DEBT is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company had long-term debt, 0 otherwise; MARKET VALUE ASSETS is the market capitalization of the firm's equity plus the book value of debt; PRODUCT DIV measures product diversification using the number of firm segments; GEOGRAPHIC DIV measures geographic diversification using the number of geographic segments; INTERSEGMENT REL measures the relatedness of the firm's segments; LMT is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the company had a low marginal tax rate, 0 otherwise; HMT is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the company had a high marginal tax rate, 0 otherwise; TOP5 DELTA is the estimated wealth increase for the top 5 executives from a 1% change in stock price; TOP5 VEGA measures the convexity of compensation of the top 5 executives; AGE is the number of years the firm has been public; Standard errors are White heteroskedasticity-adjusted and are clustered for the same company (Rogers, 1993) . In parenthesis we report t-statistics. 
